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Risk Disclosure in the European Insurance
Industry: Implications for Occupational
Pension Funds
Karel Van Hulle

The original aim of insurance undertakings and occupational pension
funds is to pool risks. Through various types of insurance policies, insurance
undertakings allow individuals to prepare for their old age by offering them
a ﬁxed guarantee. That guarantee is delivered on the basis of an insurance
premium paid by policyholders and invested by insurance entities. Similarly,
occupational pension funds provided for pension entitlements on the basis
of an agreement between the employer and the employees. The entitlement
was delivered on the basis of premiums paid by the employer on behalf
of the employees and invested by the pension fund at its own risk (often
sponsored by the employer).
Because of the volatility in ﬁnancial markets and increasing longevity,
insurance entities and occupational pension funds in the European Union
(EU) are moving away from providing ﬁxed guarantees. Investment risk is
then no longer borne by the institution, but instead transferred to policyholders (unit-linked businesses) and to the members of the pension fund
(deﬁned contribution (DC) plans), who now bear investment risk.
Risk disclosure must take account of this changing environment. It is
important to ﬁrst describe the regulatory changes before analyzing risk
disclosure in more detail.

Solvency II: The New Risk-Based Solvency Capital
Regime for the European Insurance Industry
All (re)insurance entities, or so-called undertakings, in the EU (about 5,000
in number) must comply with insurance legislation adopted by the Council
of the European Union and the European Parliament. This takes the
form of a directive, which is a legal instrument addressed to the 28 member
states of the EU, requiring them to transpose its provisions into national law
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within a stated period of time. Application of European legislation by
member states is supervised by the European Court of Justice. From January
1, 2016, all EAA member states, that is, all EU member states plus Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Norway, must apply the new risk-based solvency capital
regime, commonly referred to as Solvency II. This new regime constitutes a
complete overhaul of past insurance solvency regulations, and as such, it will
have a profound impact on the activities of (re)insurance entities in the EU.

Why Solvency II?
The prior solvency regime, often referred to as Solvency I, was developed
in the 1970s (Sandström 2011). It required insurers to set up technical
provisions for their expected risks and to create a capital buffer, called
a solvency margin, for unexpected risks. The capital buffer mainly looked
at underwriting risk. The disadvantage of this limited approach to risk
became apparent during the capital market crisis at the beginning of
the 21st century. The capital buffer did not require insurers to hold
sufﬁcient capital for market risk, and there were no speciﬁc rules dealing
with concentration risk. As a result, many insurers that were heavily
invested in equity suffered major losses when the value of their investments went down.
In general, Solvency I did not contain an incentive for insurers to manage
their risks properly. As a result, some insurers were operating with too much
capital, while other insurers were underwriting business for which they
lacked capital. Furthermore, studies have shown that, when insurers fail, it
is less likely due to an insufﬁcient amount of capital, but more likely to a lack
of proper governance and poor management (Sharma 2002). This qualitative aspect of prudential supervision, already recognized in Basel II, had not
yet been reﬂected in EU insurance regulation. Another important weakness
that resulted from Solvency I is that insufﬁcient attention was being paid to
group supervision. Most supervisors in the EU were in favor of solo supervision and looked at group supervision as a form of supplementary supervision, rather than as a form of supervision in its own right.
In terms of public disclosure and supervisory reporting, Solvency I mainly
provided for (limited) supervisory reporting. Public disclosure was limited
to the ﬁling of ﬁnancial statements and an annual report. However,
these ﬁnancial statements, which also served as a basis for prudential supervision under Solvency I, were not fully harmonized (European Economic
Community 1991). Moreover, comparability of ﬁnancial statements between
undertakings was limited. This was particularly true for the valuation of
technical provisions, for which no agreement could be reached on a uniform accounting treatment.
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The 1999 Financial Services Action Plan undertook a reform of the
Solvency I regime (European Commission 1999). In contrast to the banking
sector, which had already been the subject of a series of reforms, the
insurance sector had thus far managed to remain outside the scope of
the reforms. It was felt that the creation of an internal market for ﬁnancial
services in the EU could not really take place without a modernization of EU
insurance regulation.

Development of Solvency II
The development of the new EU risk-based solvency capital regime started
with the European Commission (EC) developing, together with experts
from the ﬁnance departments of member states and from national supervisory authorities, a Framework for Consultation. This set out the main
characteristics of the new solvency regime. On the basis of this Framework,
the EC developed a series of questions addressed to the Committee of
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS),
set up in 2001 as part of the so-called Lamfalussy reform. This grew out of
a report submitted by a Committee of Wise Men under the chairmanship of
Alexandre Lamfalussy (Lamfalussy 2001). This report emphasized the
important role of national supervisory authorities in the practical implementation of EU legislation on ﬁnancial services. The report also advocated
a principles-based approach to regulation, whereby EU regulation should
only set principles that could then be implemented by the EC and by
national supervisory authorities.
The EC sent out three series of Calls for Advice to CEIOPS over the period
2005–6. This resulted in about 1,000 pages of technical advice subsequently
summarized into 60 pages of EU legislation that formed the basis for the
new solvency regime. At the request of member states, the EC also codiﬁed
the 13 existing insurance Directives into one single document, to which
were added the new provisions containing the new solvency regime. These
replaced the old Solvency I solvency provisions. This document was introduced in 2007 as the ofﬁcial proposal for a Solvency II Framework Directive
(European Commission 2007).
Following the Lamfalussy approach, Solvency II was developed as a regulatory regime with different levels. Level 1 contained the basic principles of
the new solvency regime. Because of its importance, this level of legislation
was adopted by the Council of the European Union and the European
Parliament (the co-legislators). Level 2 comprised the implementing measures developed by the EC based upon a delegation from the Council and
the European Parliament and upon advice submitted by CEIOPS. Level 3
consisted of Guidelines and Recommendations from CEIOPS to ensure a
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common interpretation of the new rules. Finally, at Level 4, a series of
measures was put in place to ensure proper enforcement.
After the adoption of the Solvency II Framework Directive by the Council
and the European Parliament on November 29, 2009 (European Union
2009), the EC and CEIOPS started to prepare the Level 2 and Level 3
measures during the course of 2009–11. The new regime was supposed to
start on November 1, 2012, but the ﬁnancial crisis, initially believed to only
inﬂuence the Level 2 implementing measures of Solvency II (CEIOPS
2009a), caused important delays in the process. In order to improve the
supervisory architecture in the EU, the EC proposed to transform
the existing European committees of supervisors, including CEIOPS,
into authorities with more powers and resources in order to strengthen
EU prudential supervision. This led to the creation of EIOPA, the successor of CEIOPS (European Union 2010a). The creation of EIOPA in
turn made it necessary to amend the recently adopted Solvency II Framework Directive. This was done through a new proposal, called Omnibus
II, which the Commission introduced in February 2011 (European
Commission 2011). This proposal also included a number of transitional
measures not provided for in the Solvency II Framework Directive, but
which were felt necessary to smooth the transition from Solvency I into
Solvency II.
The negotiation of Omnibus II took more time than expected (three
years), for a number of political and technical reasons. On the political side,
the European Parliament, whose powers had been increased as a result of
the Lisbon Treaty of December 13, 2007 (European Union 2007), wanted to
have more say in the development of the new solvency regime. It therefore
insisted that a number of topics traditionally dealt with by the EC would now
be adopted at Level 1. Furthermore, it insisted that the Solvency II Framework Directive would allow the adoption of Regulatory Technical Standards
and Implementing Technical Standards, which would be developed by
EIOPA and become legally binding after endorsement by the EC. The
advantage of this approach was that both the Council and the European
Parliament would then have the possibility to scrutinize the texts before
their endorsement at the EC. On the technical side, the low interest rate
environment and the volatility in ﬁnancial markets made it difﬁcult to
develop a solution for the treatment of long-term guarantees. It was difﬁcult
to agree on the deﬁnition of the appropriate risk-free rate for the discounting of technical provisions, since the government bond rate, which had until
the break-out of the ﬁnancial crisis been considered as the reference point
for a risk-free rate, could no longer be considered as risk-free. In addition,
because of the existence of many different life insurance products, a
one-size-ﬁts-all solution for the treatment of long-term guarantees was not
possible. Moreover, it was necessary to introduce tailor-made transitional

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2016, SPi

72 Retirement System Risk Management

measures for the existing book of life insurance contracts, which had been
negotiated in a completely different legal and economic environment.
Omnibus II was ﬁnally adopted on April 16, 2014 (European Union
2014). Because of the delay in the ﬁnalization of the Level 1 regulation, it
was impossible to proceed with the adoption of the Level 2 and Level 3 rules.
As a result, the start date of Solvency II had to be postponed several times.
The Level 2 legislation was adopted as a Commission Delegated Act on
October 10, 2014, published in the Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Union on
January 17, 2015 after a three-month scrutiny by the European Parliament
and the Council (European Commission 2014a). Meanwhile, EIOPA had
started the development of the Level 3 rules in the form of technical
standards (Regulatory Technical Standards and Implementing Technical
Standards) and guidelines. All relevant texts were ﬁnalized in June 2015.
As a result of the delays in the development of Solvency II, the new
regime became applicable in 2016. Member states need to transpose the
Framework Directive of 2009 (amended by Omnibus II in 2014) by March
31, 2015. In total, the Solvency II package will comprise about 2,000 pages
of regulation.

Essential features of Solvency II
Solvency II follows the three-pillar approach of Basel II. The ﬁrst pillar
contains the quantitative requirements; the second pillar the qualitative
requirements; and the third pillar the supervisory reporting and disclosure
requirements. The three pillars are of equal importance and are interlinked. Overarching them is group supervision, which is equally important
to solo supervision (see Figure 5.1).
As the new solvency regime applies to all (re)insurance entities, the
nature, size, and complexity of the businesses concerned must be taken
into account. This is done through the proportionality principle, which
applies to all provisions in each of the three pillars. Moreover, this principle
must be respected by the EC and by EIOPA in the further development of
the Level 2 and Level 3 measures, and it must also guide supervisory
authorities when carrying out their task.
Pillar 1 requires the development of a solvency balance sheet in which all
assets and liabilities are calculated on a market-consistent basis. Two capital
requirements are introduced: a Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) which
reﬂects unexpected quantiﬁable risks (such as market risk, credit risk,
underwriting risk, and operational risk) and can be calculated on the basis
of a standard formula1 or on the basis of an internal model to be approved
by the supervisory authority and a Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR),
which represents an absolute ﬂoor. If the SCR is breached, the supervisory
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Group supervision &
cross-sectoral convergence
Groups are recognized as an economic entity =>
supervision on a consolidated basis (diversification
benefits, group risks)

Pillar 1: quantitative requirements

Pillar 2: quantitative requirements
and supervision

Pillar 3: prudential reporting and
public disclosure

1. Harmonized calculation of
technical provisions
2. ‘Prudent person’ approach to
investments instead of current
quantitative restrictions
3. Two capital requirements: the
Solvency Capital
Requirement (SCR) and the
Minimum Capital
Requirement (MCR)

1. Enhanced governance, internal
control, risk management and
own risk and solvency
assessment (ORSA)
2. Strengthened supervisory
review, harmonized
supervisory standards and
practices

1. Common supervisory
reporting
2. Public disclosure of the
financial condition and
solvency report
(market discipline through
transparency)

Figure 5.1 Financial regulation: three pillars and a roof
Source : Author’s contribution.

authority must analyze the causes for the breach together with the insurance
undertaking concerned as part of the Supervisory Review Process (SRP).
This dialogue is an essential feature of Solvency II, and remedies must be
taken to ensure that the SCR is restored as quickly as possible. If the
Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) is breached, the supervisory authority
must place the undertaking into run-off. The SCR does not provide an
absolute guarantee, since it is calculated on the basis of a conﬁdence level
of 99.5 percent VaR over a one-year time horizon. Figure 5.2 provides an
overview of Pillar 1.
Pillar 2 introduces the new governance rules, which require all insurers to
implement four functions: risk management, internal control, internal
audit, and actuarial. The persons managing these functions as well as the
members of the board must be ﬁt and proper. Each undertaking must
develop an own risk and solvency assessment (ORSA) at least annually, in
which it examines its solvency position in comparison with its SCR. The
ORSA, which can be regarded as the DNA of the insurance undertaking,
must ensure that the undertaking does not underwrite business for which it
lacks the necessary capital. Pillar 2 also introduces new (more extensive)
powers for supervisory authorities, such as on-site and off-site inspection,
and stress testing.
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Solvency capital requirement (SCR)
Minimum capital requirement (MCR)
Risk margin
…for non-hedgeable risks
Best estimate
Technical provisions
Market consistent valuation for
hedgeable risks

Figure 5.2 Overview of Pillar One
Source : Author’s contribution.

Pillar 3 deals with public disclosure and supervisory reporting. All insurers
must produce a Solvency and Financial Condition Report which must be
made publicly available. In addition, they must provide supervisory authorities with the regular ORSA supervisory report, along with annual and
quarterly quantitative templates specifying in greater detail and supplementing the information presented in the Solvency and Financial Condition
Report. Small insurers may be relieved from some of the supervisory reporting requirements on the basis of the proportionality principle.
As group supervision has now been elevated to the same importance as
solo supervision, parent undertakings will also have to calculate a group SCR
and a group MCR. They must conduct a group ORSA, prepare and publish a
Group Solvency and Financial Condition Report, and submit to national
supervisory authorities annual and quarterly quantitative templates.

Occupational Pension Funds
Occupational pension funds became the subject of EU regulation rather
late, to some extent due to the fact that pension policy had traditionally
been regarded as ‘national territory.’ In accordance with EU law, member
states retain full responsibility for the organization of their pension systems,
as well as for decisions on the relative roles of each of the three retirement
system pillars (social security, occupational pension funds, and private
insurance/savings). Attempts by the EC to create an internal market for
occupational pension funds were initially strongly resisted by member states,
as they were considered a direct attack on what had been traditionally
regarded as an area of exclusive competence for member states.
Today, there are about 110,000 pension funds in the EU, most of which
are situated in Ireland (62,000), the UK (44,600), the Netherlands (381),
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Italy (310), Belgium (199), Portugal (191), Germany (178), and Sweden (85).
There are virtually no employer-based pension funds in the new member
states in Central and Eastern Europe, or in the Baltic States.

The Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision
(IORP) Directive of 2003
The 1999 Financial Services Action Plan stressed the urgent need to deal at
EU level with the prudential supervision of institutions for occupational
retirement provision (IORPs). Two main reasons were given. First, occupational pension funds are major ﬁnancial institutions with a key role in
ensuring the integration, efﬁciency, and liquidity of ﬁnancial markets. Second, making them subject to a coherent EU legislative framework would
allow them to beneﬁt fully from the advantages of the internal market.
The ﬁrst step on the way to an internal market for occupational pension
funds was made by the IORP Directive. An occupational pension fund is
deﬁned in Article 6(a) of this Directive as
an institution, irrespective of its legal form, operating on a funded basis, established separately from any sponsoring undertaking or trade for the purpose of
providing retirement beneﬁts in the context of an occupational activity on the
basis of an agreement or a contract agreed, individually or collectively between
the employer(s) and the employee(s) or their respective representatives, or with
self-employed persons, in compliance with the legislation of the home and host
Member States. (European Community 2003: 5)

The Directive required occupational pension funds to be registered and to
be supervised by a competent supervisory authority. It laid down some
solvency rules (technical provisions, investment rules, regulatory own
funds) and made it possible for undertakings located in one member state
to sponsor an occupational pension fund authorized in another member
state. The prudential rules for occupational pension funds that offer
deﬁned beneﬁts are similar to those applying to life insurance undertakings.
They are therefore also required to hold regulatory own funds that serve as a
buffer. Occupational pension funds that only provide for DC pension
schemes do not have to hold a capital buffer.
As far as technical provisions are concerned, Article 15 of the IORP
Directive required IORPs to establish an adequate amount of liabilities
corresponding to the ﬁnancial commitments arising out of pension contracts. Where IORPs provide for deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) pension schemes,
they are required to establish sufﬁcient technical provisions in respect of the
total range of these schemes. The minimum amount of these technical
provisions is to be calculated on a forward-looking, going-concern basis,
including a margin for adverse deviation. The Directive does not require a
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risk-free discount rate: rather, it allows the use of asset-based rates, highquality corporate bond yields, and government bond yields. Article 14(2) of
the IORP Directive provides for supervisory powers if an institution fails to
establish sufﬁcient technical provisions, but it does not include the explicit
supervisory power to require the IORP to increase the amount of technical
provisions.
In terms of transparency, the Directive requires an occupational pension
fund to provide certain information to the competent authorities, such as
its annual accounts and annual reports. Yet there are no speciﬁc rules for
these annual accounts and annual reports. The authorities are particularly
interested in collecting information about funding, operational, market,
liquidity, and credit risks (EIOPA 2011). Members and beneﬁciaries must
also receive, on request, a copy of the annual accounts and of the annual
report, as well as of the statement of investment policy principles. Each
member may also request detailed and substantial information on key
elements of the pension scheme.

Revision of the IORP Directive
Though one of the main objectives of the 2003 Directive was to open up the
market for cross-border pension arrangements, it must be admitted that the
Directive was not a success. Indeed, the number of cross-border arrangements increased marginally from 70 in June 2008 to 76 in 2015. Compared
with the total number of occupational pension funds in the EU (110,000),
this can hardly be called an impressive achievement (EIOPA 2015). There
are numerous reasons for this: the need for an occupational pension fund to
respect the local social and labor law (and the lack of clarity about this
concept), the need to ensure that the technical provisions are fully funded
at all times in the case of cross-border activity, the difﬁculty of transferring
pension assets from one member state to another, and the difﬁculties in
dealing with different national supervisory authorities in home and host
member states. Although the last topic was governed by the so-called Budapest Protocol in the context of CEIOPS (CEIOPS 2009b), the working
relationships between home and host authorities were made difﬁcult by a
lack of clarity about the applicable rules. CEIOPS therefore called several
times on the EC to revise the IORP Directive on this particular issue.
While the EC was preparing an overhaul of its solvency rules for insurance
undertakings, the question was raised in 2006 whether occupational
pension funds should be included in the scope of the new solvency regime
(Solvency II). There was some logic to this, particularly for DB schemes. In
fact, past reference had been made in the IORP Directive to the Solvency
I rules applying to life insurance undertakings, rules that would be abolished
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under Solvency II. It would therefore seem logical to make the new solvency
rules also applicable to occupational pension funds. Yet after reﬂection, the
EC decided not to extend the scope of application of Solvency II to occupational pension funds because the Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS) that
analyzed the potential impact of the new solvency regime on the insurance
industry did not cover occupational pension funds. It was believed to be
imprudent to extend the application of the new regime without prior
examination of the potential impact. Yet organizing a new QIS speciﬁcally
for occupational pension funds would have delayed the introduction of the
new solvency regime.
During the negotiation of the Solvency II Framework Directive in the
European Parliament, several amendments were tabled asking for an extension of the scope to include occupational pension funds. In the end, the
Council and the European Parliament decided to keep the status quo. In the
Preamble of the Solvency II Framework Directive (recital 138), the EC was
asked to conduct a review of the IORP Directive as soon as possible.
On July 7, 2010, the Commission published a Green Paper for consultation on adequate, sustainable, and safe European pension systems
(European Commission 2010). It drew almost 1,700 responses from across
the EU, including from member states, national parliaments, business and
trade union organizations, civil society, and industry representatives. The
Green Paper puts much emphasis on the adequacy and sustainability of
pension promises. In order to ensure sustainability, the Green Paper proposed a revision of the solvency rules in the IORP Directive. In order to
ensure that occupational pensions can actually deliver what they promise,
the liabilities and the assets to cover those liabilities must be properly
reﬂected on the solvency balance sheet. In a follow-up White Paper on
adequate, sustainable, and safe European pension systems of February 16,
2012, the EC conﬁrmed its intention to revise the IORP Directive (European
Commission 2012a).
On April 7, 2011, the EC asked EIOPA for advice on a revision of the
IORP Directive. The EC gave three main reasons: the development of
measures which would simplify the setting up of cross-border pension
schemes; the introduction of a risk-based solvency regime for occupational
pension funds coupled with measures that would allow pension funds to
beneﬁt from risk mitigation mechanisms; and a modernization of the prudential rules covering DC schemes. EIOPA organized two consultations on
its draft advice. On February 15, 2012, EIOPA came forward with its ﬁnal
advice (518 pages), and it organized an exchange of views among stakeholders during a public hearing in March 2012 (EIOPA 2012).
In its advice on possible new (harmonized) solvency rules, EIOPA proposed the adoption of a holistic balance sheet to allow full comparability
between the different risk-sharing mechanisms that exist in member states.
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The allocation of the demographic and ﬁnancial risks of occupational
pension commitments differs greatly between member states. Thus, risks
are sometimes borne by the pension fund itself (e.g., in the Netherlands), by
the sponsoring undertaking (e.g., in the United Kingdom), by the members
and beneﬁciaries (e.g., in the case of DC pension schemes), or any combination thereof. European pension funds also use different security mechanisms, such as solvency capital, sponsor support, and pension protection
schemes, and they use different beneﬁt adjustment mechanisms, such as
conditional indexation, for-proﬁt mechanisms, and the possibility of reducing accrued beneﬁts as a measure of last resort.
In the holistic balance sheet proposed by EIOPA, all security and beneﬁt
adjustment mechanisms must be explicitly included. Thus, the asset side
would include the value of sponsor support and pension protection
schemes, while the liability side takes account of the unconditional, conditional, and discretionary nature of the beneﬁts as well as possible beneﬁt
reductions. The holistic balance sheet follows the market-consistent
approach of Solvency II: all assets and liabilities must be valued on a
market-consistent basis. In the view of EIOPA, this is the only way to achieve
a comparable and realistic view of an occupational pension fund’s ﬁnancial
situation. The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) in the holistic balance
sheet measures whether the pension fund has sufﬁcient capital, security
mechanisms, and/or beneﬁt adjustment mechanisms to absorb demographic and ﬁnancial shocks given a certain conﬁdence level (99.5 percent
VaR over a one-year time horizon).
At the request of the EC, EIOPA carried out a QIS in 2012 to collect
information on the ﬁnancial impact of the holistic balance sheet on occupational pension funds. Results of this QIS were published in July 2013
(EIOPA 2013), and eight member states participated in the exercise:
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway (member of the
European Economic Area), Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In the benchmark scenario, IORPs were requested to include all security
and beneﬁt adjustment mechanisms on their holistic balance sheet, and to
value all assets and liabilities on a market-consistent basis by discounting
future cash ﬂows using the risk-free interest rate. It is important to note that
IORPs providing only pure DC schemes, which do not provide any guarantees, were not included in the QIS exercise.
In its report on this QIS exercise, EIOPA pointed out that the overall
impact of the holistic balance sheet differed substantially across participating countries, from substantial surpluses in some countries to large shortfalls
in other countries. This is due to differences in the availability of ﬁnancial
assets and the relative strength of the existing security and beneﬁt adjustment mechanisms. For instance, German ‘Pensionsfonds’ are able to reduce
the SCR to zero through the loss-absorbing capacity of sponsor support and

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/9/2016, SPi

Risk Disclosure in European Insurance

79

pension protection schemes, the latter effectively absorbing all residual risk.
On the other hand, the German ‘Pensionskassen’ in most cases have sponsor support but are not covered by the national pension protection scheme.
This results in a relatively modest shortfall relative to liabilities and the
SCR. In Ireland, there was a substantial shortfall because the sponsor support on which the IORP can count is not legally mandatory, so the employer
can choose not to provide support. In the UK, there is a shortfall with
respect to liabilities as well as the SCR. All IORPs in the UK are covered by
unlimited sponsor support, but the value of sponsor support recognized is,
in most cases, not sufﬁcient to close the gap, nor does the Pension Protection Fund guarantee the full level of beneﬁts. EIOPA decided to continue its
technical work to improve the deﬁnitions and methodologies for implementing the holistic balance sheet. In 2014, it launched a public consultation on ‘Further Work on Solvency of IORPs’ (EIOPA 2014), met with great
reservations by the pension fund sector.2
The main argument against introducing a Solvency II type of regime was
that the holistic balance sheet approach was conceptually wrong. It suggested that a volatile mark-to-market valuation of pension liabilities would
be unsuitable for the assessment of very long-duration pension liabilities,
since reﬂecting these liabilities at their current market value would be
purely theoretical and not informative on future developments of the
IORP’s ﬁnancial position. Other arguments referred to the unacceptable
burden that such a regime would place on IORPs and their sponsors, with
the consequence that employers would no longer want to provide this
important social beneﬁt and that members’ beneﬁts would be lowered as
the members would have to bear additional costs. The holistic balance sheet
would not be suitable as a regulatory instrument at EU level. At most it could
serve as an internal risk management tool. As stated by Pensions Europe:
‘Putting more money aside to cover risks that might be overcome over time
would also make long-term investment ﬁnancing of the economy more
difﬁcult and would have a substantial impact on further economic development, innovation and growth’ (2015: 3).
The issue of volatility was also discussed at the OECD, which concluded that
disclosure to plan stakeholders based on current market values of pension assets
and liabilities may be appropriate to increase transparency, and the use of current
market values could improve risk management. However, regulators should operate ﬂexibly when reviewing a scheme’s funding position or regulators should
enable pension funds and plan sponsors to dampen somewhat the volatility of
market prices when determining contributions. (Yermo and Severinson 2010: 4–5)

Meanwhile, after serious lobbying by the social partners at EU level,3
and by an alliance of ﬁve governments (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), published on the website of the
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Belgian Federation of Pension Funds (BVPI), the EC announced in May
2013 that it would come forward with a proposal to revise the IORP Directive
without a Solvency II-type regime. The proposal was presented in March
2014 (European Commission 2014b). Although it left the solvency rules in
the 2003 Directive largely untouched, the proposal led to a great deal of
controversy in the EC and the business community. Within the EC, the
Impact Assessment Board, whose opinion is required for every proposal
made by the EC, refused to give a positive opinion on the proposal to revise
the IORP Directive. In the business community, Business Europe called for
‘a thorough overhaul’ of the new Commission proposal. This statement led
to an opposing statement in December of 2014 by a number of organizations representing civil society,4 insisting that ‘this modest proposal’ should
be adopted as quickly as possible. Under the Greek and Italian Presidencies,
the Council made swift progress in the course of 2014 and adopted its
position on the proposal on December 10, 2014. This position enabled
negotiation with the European Parliament. However, because it was uncertain whether the EC would withdraw its proposal, the European Parliament
only appointed a Rapporteur for the proposal in December 2014. The
discussion within the European Parliament is ongoing, with a vote in the
European Parliament to be followed by negotiations with the Council and
with the EC. The plenary vote in the European Parliament took place in
December 2015. Final approval by the Council and the European Parliament seems likely during the course of 2016.

Essential features of the Revised IORP Directive Proposal
The revised IORP proposal had four key objectives: (1) to improve governance and risk management within IORPs; (2) to remove the remaining
obstacles for cross-border provision of services; (3) to ensure that supervisors have the necessary tools to effectively supervise IORPs; and (4) to
provide clear and relevant information to members and beneﬁciaries.
While there was a great deal of disagreement about the usefulness of
introducing quantitative rules similar to Solvency II, most stakeholders
agreed that there was a need to improve the governance requirements for
occupational pension funds (European Commission 2012b). A number of
examples of failures or difﬁculties resulting from a lack of risk management
in pension funds were provided in the EC’s Impact Assessment Report
accompanying the Revised IORP Directive Proposal (2014c). There also
was a large degree of support for improved information for pension scheme
members and beneﬁciaries, particularly in the case of DC pensions.
The governance provisions (Articles 21 to 30) were largely borrowed from
Solvency II, (Articles 40 to 50 of the Solvency II Framework Directive)
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although they are less detailed. IORPs will have to put in place key governance functions: risk management, internal audit, and actuarial (only
required for IORPs that run DB pension schemes). Internal control is not
established as a separate function. The persons occupying these functions
must be ﬁt and proper. Great importance is attached to proper risk management. Similar to the ORSA for insurance undertakings under Solvency II,
IORPs will need to carry out their own risk assessment by producing a risk
evaluation for pensions in order to document that assessment (Article 29). If
conducted properly, this risk evaluation should clearly show any funding gaps
and force IORPs to think about ways and means to close that gap. In the
proposal, the EC can further develop the principles in the Directive concerning risk evaluation in a Delegated Act. However, the Delegated Act ‘shall
not impose additional funding requirements beyond those foreseen in the
Directive’ (Article 30).
As under Solvency II (Article 29 of the Solvency II Framework Directive),
supervision of IORPs will have to be based on a prospective and risk-based
approach (Article 61). The proposal (Article 63) also introduces the Supervisory Review Process, which is a key element of Solvency II (Article 36 of the
Solvency II Framework Directive). Although Article 63 of the proposal is
more modest than Article 36 of the Solvency II Framework Directive, it still
upgrades the role of the supervisory authorities by requiring them to carry
out an assessment of the qualitative requirements relating to the system of
governance, of the risks the institution faces, and of the ability of the
institution to assess those risks. It also introduces stress-testing as a monitoring tool. IORPs must also make available to the competent authorities a copy
of their risk evaluations for pensions (Article 64). New provisions (Articles
66 to 71) deal with professional secrecy; the transmission of information to
central banks, monetary authorities, European Supervisory Authorities—
EIOPA, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European
Banking Authority (EBA)—and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB);
the disclosure of information to government administrations responsible for
ﬁnancial legislation; and conditions for the exchange of information.
A crucial feature of the proposal concerns the information to members
and beneﬁciaries. It introduces a Pension Beneﬁt Statement standardized at
EU level (Articles 40 to 54) that provides pension scheme members with
simple and clear information about their individual pension entitlements. It
aims to support informed decision-making about pension adequacy
(answering the question ‘do I need to save more to maintain my standard
of living after retirement?’) and investment strategy (answering the question
‘is my investment approach right?’). The Pension Beneﬁt Statement was
inspired by the Key Investor Document (KID) required under the legislation on open investment funds (European Union 2010b). It is particularly
important in the case of DC pension schemes where members bear
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investment risk. In order to have a standardized document, the proposal
provides for the EC to further specify the form and the contents of the
Pension Beneﬁt Statement in a Delegated Act (Article 54). The proposal
also provides for information to be given to prospective members (Article
55), to members during the pre-retirement phase (Article 56), and to
beneﬁciaries during the pay-out phase.
The Council adopted its position on the EC proposal in December of
2014 (the so-called ‘general approach’). Any disagreements between the
Council and the European Parliament will be dealt with during a Trilogue,
in which both co-legislators and the EC will participate. The Council’s
position departs to some extent from the proposal introduced by the
EC. The most important departures include the fact that the Council does
not accept any Delegated Act, which means that the provisions in the Directive on subjects such as the Risk Evaluation for Pensions and the Pension
Beneﬁt Statement will have to be self-sufﬁcient. Moreover, the Council introduces internal control as the fourth key function. The Council also considers
that persons running the IORP should have adequate professional qualiﬁcations collectively, rather than individually. The Council further details the
contents of the Risk Evaluation for Pensions. And the Council removed some
of the form requirements for the Pension Beneﬁt Statement and made a
clearer distinction between the information to be given in the case of a DC
pension scheme and a DB pension scheme.

Comparison between Insurance Undertakings
and Occupational Pension Funds
The discussions about applying Solvency II measures to occupational pensions clearly show that there often is a lack of understanding about the
differences between insurance entities and pension funds. Identifying who
bears the ultimate risk and what types of risk disclosures are relevant is thus
in order.

Are occupational pension funds ﬁnancial institutions?
It is often argued that occupational pension funds are ﬁnancial institutions
like banks or insurance undertakings. Accordingly, the same risk-based solvency approach should apply to all such categories of ﬁnancial institutions, and
doing otherwise would destroy the level playing ﬁeld in the market.
Nevertheless, this view overlooks the fact that occupational pension funds
are institutions created by the social partners, employers, and employees. It
is for them to decide what pension entitlements will be available and under
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which conditions. Under this latter perspective, several consequences ﬂow.
First, in terms of the deﬁnitive character of the pension promise: a pension
promise agreed between the social partners can more easily be changed
than an insurance contract. Second, in terms of the party that bears the
ultimate risk: occupational pension funds are linked to a sponsoring
employer, while insurance undertakings are ultimately liable for the risks
which they underwrite. Third, in terms of transparency: because of their
close linkage to a sponsoring employer, there may be less need for occupational pension funds to provide information (such as ﬁnancial statements)
to the public at large than is the case for insurance undertakings. Fourth, in
terms of the supply of capital: the suppliers of capital to an occupational
pension fund (employers and members) have more extensive commitments
than providers of equity to insurance undertakings. They may be required to
provide additional capital in the case of a shortfall, they might have to accept
a reduction in the beneﬁts, or they may have to spread the cost between
generations for schemes of a collective nature. Fifth, in terms of the governance of the institution: occupational pension funds are not-for-proﬁt entities
and the members or their representatives are often closely involved in the
governance of the institution. Sixth, in terms of supervision: the average
duration of pension fund liabilities is longer than in the case of insurance
undertakings, which means that more time can be given to occupational
pension funds to recover a funding deﬁcit. Seventh, in terms of the competent authority for supervision: as occupational pension funds can be seen as
part of the broader social policy of the country, the competent authority for
the supervision of occupational pension funds is not necessarily the same as
the competent authority for the supervision of insurance undertakings.
Despite these differences, occupational pension funds manage assets worth
€2.6 trillion and are important players in the ﬁnancial market. They are
important institutional investors and can compete with insurance entities.
This is particularly true in a number of European countries (for instance,
Sweden), where insurance entities carry the pension liabilities on their balance sheet. Less stringent investment rules and the use of a discount rate that
is not risk-free (for instance, determined by reference to the expected rate of
return on assets) can distort a pension fund’s true ﬁnancial situation. It can
therefore rightly be argued that the overall supervisory regime for occupational pension funds should broadly follow that which applies to banks and
insurance entities. This is also valid from a ﬁnancial stability point of view,
considering the overall importance of occupational pension funds and the
size of DB pensions. In terms of transparency, it is difﬁcult to argue that
members should not be informed about the funding position of their DB
pension scheme. In the end, it is all about risk. Information based upon a
mark-to-market valuation, properly applied and taking into account the long
duration of pension liabilities, is still the best reﬂection of risk.
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The movement from DB to DC
Initially, the workplace-based pension schemes offered in Europe were DB
schemes. The employer committed to pay to the employee a lifetime
monthly beneﬁt on retirement for each year of service. The risks during
the accumulation phase (e.g., investment and operational risk) and the
biometric risk during the pay-out phase (mortality) are fully borne either
by the employer, the pension fund, or both. By contrast, in DC schemes, the
employer commits to contributing on behalf of the employees a certain cash
amount per month of service. At retirement, the employee can access the
savings accumulated in the pension fund to ﬁnance the pay-out phase, and
risks during the accumulation phase are fully borne by the employee. The
employee also fully bears the biometric risk during the pay-out phase, unless
national law mandates the purchase of an annuity (as was the case in the UK
until recently). Between the two ends of the spectrum, there are a number
of hybrid schemes such as average-salary DB schemes, DC schemes with
guarantees, part DB/DC schemes, etc. Hybrid schemes also share the risks
between employers and employees.
DC schemes are comparable to investment funds because the outcome
depends entirely on investment returns. DB schemes are comparable to life
insurance products because they offer protection against risk. DB schemes
are not necessarily risk-free for members and beneﬁciaries: they may reduce
accrued pension rights if their funding position deteriorates. This happened, for instance, in the Netherlands, where since the outbreak of the
ﬁnancial crisis, 68 IORPs were compelled to curtail accrued pension rights,
affecting 300,000 individuals. In the UK, pension funds that fail may be
taken over by the Pension Protection Fund, but in that case, pension rights
are cut by 10 percent (European Commission 2014c).
For a number of reasons such as the low interest rate environment and
the increase of longevity, many occupational pension funds have discontinued DB pension schemes and are now operating DC pension schemes.
In the EU, the predominant pension scheme is DC in Bulgaria,
Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia;
while it is DB in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom (European Commission 2014c). Those
who oppose the introduction of risk-based solvency requirements for occupational pension funds argue that the introduction of such a regime could
further fuel the movement towards DC pensions. The solvency debate is
largely limited to those occupational pension funds that offer DB pension
schemes. Already today, the IORP Directive provides for a different treatment between IORPs that operate a DB pension scheme and IORPs that
operate a DC pension scheme. It is only in the ﬁrst case that IORPs
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must hold a capital buffer. If a risk-based solvency regime were to be broadly
introduced, that distinction would remain. But IORPs that only operate
DC pension schemes would need to introduce a capital buffer for operational risk.
The movement from DB to DC can also be seen in the insurance industry.
Low interest rates and rising longevity have led many insurers to avoid longterm guarantees and instead introduce various forms of unit-linked products whereby the policyholder bears the ultimate investment risk. By doing
so, insurance undertakings will need to hold less capital.
Looked at from a Solvency II perspective, occupational pension funds and
insurance undertakings ﬁnd themselves in a similar situation: as both move
away from offering some form of hard guarantee, they must hold less capital.
This is not so much the result of the new risk-based solvency regime, but the
logical consequence of a policy change responding to the new socioeconomic environment. For both sectors, the question that remains is how
to deal with existing contracts that offer long-term guarantees. Under Solvency II, this matter has been dealt with in the context of the amendment of
the Solvency II Framework Directive by Omnibus II. A similar solution
(including a long transition period) could also be introduced for occupational pension funds. Key in this respect is an agreement on the applicable
risk-free discount rate for the calculation of pension liabilities.

Risk Disclosure
The transparency requirements under Solvency II (Pillar 3) distinguish
between supervisory reporting and public disclosure. At present, the EU
requirements (which are minimum requirements) on supervisory reporting
and public disclosure for insurance entities and pension funds are relatively
modest. This will fundamentally change for insurers under Solvency II. For
the ﬁrst time, harmonized information will be available at the EU level, both
to national competent authorities (and to EIOPA), and to the public at
large. This will be done through a supervisory reporting package which
includes quarterly and annual reporting templates, through the Solvency
and Financial Conditions Report, and through the annual accounts
and annual report. Both in the supervisory reporting package and in the
Solvency and Financial Conditions Report, risk disclosure plays an important role. Risk disclosure under Solvency II relates to the risks incurred by the
insurance entity and it will be available to the public at large.
For occupational pension funds, the proposal to revise the 2003 Directive
will introduce more elaborate supervisory reporting requirements. Because
of the absence of harmonized Pillar 1 requirements (on capital and on
valuation of assets and liabilities), the information collected by national
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competent authorities and transmitted to EIOPA or to the ESRB will remain
difﬁcult to compare. In terms of public disclosure, occupational pension
funds are not required to provide any speciﬁc information about the risks
incurred to the public at large. The information requirements are limited to
the prospective members, members, and beneﬁciaries. A key element in the
disclosure to the members is the new proposed Pension Beneﬁt Statement.
Risk disclosure in the case of occupational pension funds is directed to the
members and beneﬁciaries and covers the risks related to their pension
scheme. This information is not available to the public at large.

Solvency and Financial Conditions Report (SFCR)
The SFCR is a new document introduced under Solvency II, which seeks to
further market discipline. Article 51 of the Solvency II Framework Directive
lists the main elements, which must be disclosed in the SFCR:
(1) a description of the business and the performance of the undertaking;
(2) a description of the system of governance and an assessment of its
adequacy for the risk proﬁle of the undertaking;
(3) a description by risk category of the risk exposure, concentration,
mitigation, and sensitivity;
(4) a description—separately for assets, technical provisions, and other
liabilities—of the bases and methods used for their valuation,
together with an explanation of any major differences in the bases
and methods used for their valuation in ﬁnancial statements; and
(5) a description of the capital management process.
These requirements are further elaborated upon in Articles 290–303 of the
Delegated Act of November 2014. Article 295 of the Delegated Act deals
speciﬁcally with disclosures related to the risk proﬁle of the undertaking.
These include:
(1) quantitative and qualitative information regarding the risk proﬁle,
separately for underwriting risk, market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk,
operational risk, and other material risks;
(2) information regarding the risk exposure (including from off-balance
sheet positions and the transfer of risk to special purpose vehicles),
such as a description of the measures used to assess risks within the
undertaking, a description of the material risks that the undertaking
is exposed to, and a description about the investment of assets in
accordance with the prudent person principle;
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(3) a description of the material risk concentration to which the undertaking is exposed;
(4) a description of the techniques used for mitigating risks and the
processes for monitoring the continued effectiveness of these
techniques;
(5) with regard to liquidity risk: the total amount of the expected proﬁt
included in future premiums;
(6) with regard to risk sensitivity: a description of the methods used, the
assumptions made, and the outcome of stress-testing and sensitivity
analysis for material risks and events; and
(7) other information regarding the risk proﬁle of the insurance
undertaking.
In case of major developments signiﬁcantly affecting the relevance of the
SFCR, the information must be updated frequently.
Insurers are not required to disclose any speciﬁc information about speciﬁc
risks incurred by policyholders. The presumption is that, if all relevant risks are
properly managed by the undertaking, the solvency position resulting from
this will most likely (subject to the agreed conﬁdence level) allow the insurer to
deliver its promises to policyholders. In terms of speciﬁc product-related
disclosures to policyholders, the Solvency II Framework Directive (Articles
183–6) includes the provisions of the earlier Directives which deal particularly
with the pre-contractual information to be delivered to policyholders. These
provisions were not updated during the negotiation of Solvency II. Most
member states have, however, extended the information requirements in
their national insurance legislation, as part of their insurance contract law.

Risk disclosure by occupational pension funds
As indicated before, present EU legislation does not impose any public
disclosure on occupational pension funds. Pension scheme arrangements
agreed between an employer and its employees are regarded as private
arrangements. Moreover, the beneﬁciaries of the pension scheme arrangements are at the same time members of the pension fund, so the disclosure
provisions in the 2003 Directive are limited to information requirements
directed to the members and beneﬁciaries. The information to be given to
the members and beneﬁciaries in accordance with Article 11 of the 2003
Directive comprises the annual accounts and annual reports, the statement
of investment principles, and some information concerning the pension
beneﬁts. Members bearing investment risk must receive information concerning investment options, along with information on risk exposure and
costs related to the investments.
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The proposal to revise the 2003 Directive does not fundamentally change
this approach. Contrary to Solvency II, the proposal does not introduce any
requirement for occupational pension funds to disclose their overall risk
position to the outside world. However, following the advice of EIOPA, the
proposal attaches a great deal of importance to more in-depth information
of the members through the new Pension Beneﬁt Statement. This Statement must be sent to each member at least once every 12 months free of
charge with an explanation of any material change to the information contained in the pension statement compared to the previous year in an accompanying letter. The statement should be easily understandable and should not
be more than two pages. It should clearly state whether there is a full guarantee
(by the institution or the sponsoring undertaking), no guarantee at all (where
the member bears the investment risk), or a partial guarantee. Where a
guarantee is provided, the statement must brieﬂy explain the nature of the
guarantee, the current level of ﬁnancing of the member’s accrued individual
entitlements, the mechanisms protecting accrued individual entitlements, and
any beneﬁt reduction mechanisms. The statement must further include information about the balance after calculation of the contributions and the costs
and show the projected beneﬁts under various hypotheses as well as give
information about past performance.
For pension schemes where members bear investment risk, the pension
beneﬁt statement must contain information about the risk and return
proﬁle showing a graphical indicator of the risk and return proﬁle of the
pension scheme or, where applicable, of each investment option. For pension schemes where members bear investment risk and where they have a
choice between different investment options, the statement must indicate
the investment proﬁles providing a list of the investment options available
and a short description of each option. For pension schemes where members bear investment risk and where an investment option is imposed on the
member by a speciﬁc rule speciﬁed in the pension scheme (default option),
additional information must be provided concerning the rules based on
actual age, the rules based on the member’s targeted retirement age, and
other rules. The EC will further elaborate the details both in terms of form
and substance by way of a Delegated Act.
In addition to the Pension Beneﬁt Statement, the proposal includes information requirements for prospective members, for members during the
pre-retirement phase, and for beneﬁciaries during the pay-out phase. On
request, members or beneﬁciaries should receive a copy of the annual accounts
and annual reports and of the statement of investment policy principles.
In the ‘general approach’ agreed by the Council on December 10, 2014, a
clearer distinction is made between the information to be provided in the
Pension Beneﬁt Statement where the pension scheme provides for a given
level of beneﬁts and where the pension scheme does not provide for a given
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level of beneﬁts. For pension schemes where members bear investment risk,
the Pension Beneﬁt Statement should provide an explanation of investment
risks which are materially relevant, a brief explanation of the actual return,
and very importantly, a statement that the lowest risk proﬁle does not mean
a risk-free investment.
Since in most member states pension scheme arrangements move away
from providing speciﬁc guarantees, a proper disclosure of the risks associated with DC pension schemes is particularly important, as the members of
the pension scheme bear the ultimate risk of the investment. The proposed
revision of the 2003 Directive responds to this concern. It was the intention
of the EC to produce a uniform Pension Beneﬁt Statement, similar to the
Key Investor Document for open investment funds (UCITS). The Council
does not seem to want that and has removed the possibility for the EC to
introduce such a statement by way of a Delegated Act.
One should not, however, forget that there are still many DB pension
schemes in the EU. For the members of those schemes, the situation does
not fundamentally change. There is no way for them to ﬁnd out to what
extent the occupational pension fund is ‘at risk.’ The risk evaluation for
pensions, which should allow occupational pension funds to have a better
insight into their risk position, remains an internal document that is only
available to the management of the pension fund and to the competent
authority. Yet risk evaluation does not mean much if it is not based on
agreed valuation standards. These valuation standards should reﬂect proper
risk management. This means that it will be difﬁcult to move away from a
market-consistent valuation. There are various ways in which a marketconsistent valuation can be calculated, particularly for pension liabilities
(Actuarial Association of Europe 2015). Problems concerning the back
book can be dealt with through long transition periods and through an
appropriate deﬁnition of the risk-free discount rate.

Conclusion
The development of an EU risk-based solvency capital regime will seriously
enhance the quality of risk management by insurance entities. Through the
Solvency and Financial Condition Report, it will be possible to get a better
insight into how insurers manage their risks and their related capital positions. Public disclosure of these documents will further stimulate insurance
undertakings to do it right.
It is regrettable that the reforms recently proposed for pension funds do
not go all the way. Although it can be argued that occupational pension
funds should not make their solvency positions public just as insurance
undertakings do, it would nevertheless be beneﬁcial to them if they were
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required to follow clear rules in terms of how to draw up a solvency balance
sheet. This chapter has shown that the development of a risk-based solvency
balance sheet in the case of occupational pension funds is more complex
than in the case of insurance undertakings. Yet it could be possible to
develop such a risk-based solvency balance sheet in stages, for instance by
starting the process with a requirement for occupational pension funds to
draw up a market-consistent balance sheet and impose risk-based capital
requirements in a second stage. Members of DB pension schemes should
have the right to know whether their pension fund is at risk, whether there is a
funding gap, and how the pension fund intends to address this. Existing
problems relating to the back book can be dealt with through long transition
periods and through an appropriate deﬁnition of the risk-free discount rate.
In terms of risk disclosure, the introduction of a Pension Beneﬁt Statement is a positive development. It allows members of occupational pension
funds who bear the risk of their investment to gain a better insight into the
risks that they incur and the ﬁnal entitlement that they could expect based
upon their investment choice or the choice made on their behalf by the
employer (as a default option).
The absence of a proper solvency regime for pension funds in the EU
creates an unfair treatment between policyholders of insurance undertakings and DB pension scheme members. This cannot be justiﬁed by the
differences between a pension promise and an insurance contract. Members of DB pension schemes should have the right to know whether their
pension fund is at risk, whether there is a funding gap, and how the pension
fund will seek to address this. This is in the end a question of consumer
protection. Through the absence of proper disclosure, DB pension scheme
members are not currently in a position to protect themselves in the
EU. The pension funds stress test launched by EIOPA in May 2015 coupled
with the quantitative assessment of a potential use of the holistic balance
sheet may provide some further insight into the possible consequences of
introducing a risk-based solvency regime for pension funds in the EU.

Glossary of Terms
CEIOPS

Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors

EAA

European Economic Area

EBA

European Banking Authority

EC

European Commission

ECON

Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European
Parliament
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EIOPA

European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority

ESMA

European Securities and Markets Authority

EMPL

Employment and Social Affairs Committee of the European
Parliament

ESRB

European Systemic Risk Board

FEMM

Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee of the
European Parliament

IORP

Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision

JURI

Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament

MCR

Minimum Capital Requirement

Omnibus II

Directive 2014/51/EU of Apr. 16, 2014 amending the
Solvency II Framework Directive

QIS

Quantitative Impact Study

SCR

Solvency Capital Requirement

SFCR

Solvency and Financial Conditions Report

Solvency II
Directive 2009/138/EC of Nov. 25, 2009 establishing a new
Framework Directive risk-based solvency regime for insurance and reinsurance
undertakings in the EU

Endnotes
1. This is attached as an annex to the Framework Directive of 2009 and further
speciﬁed in the Delegated Act of Oct. 10, 2014.
2. See, e.g., the comment letters from the UK National Association of Pension Funds
(www.napf.co.uk), the Dutch Pensioenfederatie (www.pensioenfederatie.nl), and
the European organization representing occupational pension funds, Pensions
Europe (www.pensionseurope.eu).
3. See the joint letter of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and
Business Europe of Feb. 14, 2012.
4. See <www.concordeurope.org>.
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